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Abstract 
This article uses game theory to investigate investor-state dispute settlement and related 
dispute resolution strategies through international arbitration. When deciding whether 
either to bring or to defend a claim rather than pursue settlement, investors and states will 
select strategies to maximize their respective payoffs, either by securing compensation or 
successfully defeating a claim for compensation. This article develops a model decision 
making strategy for claimant investors and defendant states based on the observed 
patterns of outcomes in actual investment treaty arbitration awards.  Embedding the 
problem in the context of utility and hence risk-aversion, it will offer a general solution 
for the arbitration “game”.  Four regions will be identified in the settlement space 
consisting of the respondent offer against claimant success probability.  It will be shown 
that no settlement is possible in three of these four regions.  The go-no-go probability of 
claimant victory below which it would not be reasonable for a potential claimant to 
proceed will be quantified.  An algorithm is developed for calculating the settlement sum 
that the respondent may offer with a reasonable expectation of acceptance by the 
claimant.  
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Thesis and Structure 
The aim of this article is to model the strategy behind the use of a specific kind of 
international litigation, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), as its users seek 
individually to maximize their private utility function. As the risks involved with ISDS 
compel both parties to evaluate the potential benefits and costs in a rational, systemic 
manner,1 this article will suggest that such assessment could be achieved through the 
application of generalised mathematical modelling, which can then be applied to specific 
situations. In short, investors and governments can more effectively ascertain whether it is 
desirable to pursue international arbitration to reach a binding decision and award as 
opposed to the alternatives, namely abandoning the claim or defence in favour of 
settlement. The modelling developed in this article embraces game theory (the natural 
methodology to model optimal decisions which depend critically upon the decisions of 
others) and utility theory (to take account of both the potentially huge sums of money 
                                                            
1 This article will not engage with behavioural economics literature stressing irrational features of decision-
making, such as those incorporating biases and heuristics: see further e.g. T Ulen, ‘The Importance of 
Behavioral Law’ in E Zamir and D Teichman eds. Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2014) 
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involved and the potential asymmetry in the wealth and attitude to risk of the 
protagonists). 
 
This article, which comprises Part I of a two-part paper, will proceed as follows.  The 
continuation of Section 1 will describe the process of ISDS and outline the methodology 
that will be employed to analyse it. Section 2 introduces a game-theoretical model for 
investment arbitration, including the notion of a general solution pointing to optimal 
courses of action for investors and states for any given scenario. Section 3 develops the 
model and provides analysis, including the application of utility theory to the arbitration 
strategy of investors and host states. A general solution is derived for the “game” being 
played by the potential claimant and respondent.  Conclusions are provided for Part I of 
the paper in Section 4.  Three appendices are included, the first providing a list of the 
symbols used in the mathematical model and the last two providing details and proofs for 
mathematical statements made in the main text. 
 
Part II2 will consider the reasons why cases are not settled between the parties and so 
proceed to arbitration.  It moves on to examine a selection of real cases that went to 
arbitration before drawing overall conclusions. 
 
1.2 Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
States seeking to attract foreign investment enter into International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs) of which there are now more than three thousand worldwide. These 
are treaties which offer protections for foreign investors, helping mitigate the risk of 
expending significant resources in politically unstable environments where there is 
limited prospect of redress through the domestic legal system.  Among the most vital of 
the guarantees contained in the treaties is access to ISDS, since it allows aggrieved 
foreign investors to bring claims directly to neutral international arbitration rather than 
pursuing remedies in the courts of the host state, which may be biased, lacking 
independence or simply lack sufficient expertise to adjudicate claims fairly and 
efficiently.3  Each year tribunals constituted under the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and under ad hoc tribunals using rules such as 
those promulgated by the United Nations Conference on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) hear an increasing number of claims by foreign investors against host 
states in relation to alleged breaches of these treaties.4 While many decisions of 
arbitration tribunals remain private because of the option of confidentiality available to 
parties under the system, during the 10 year period from 2004 to 2014, the number of 
published decisions issued by investment tribunals has risen fourfold, from 149 cases to 
more than 600.  
 
ISDS poses very significant financial risks in terms of wasted legal expenses without 
compensation for governmental interference (for the claimant investors), and wasted 
expenses as well as a major adverse damages award potentially in the hundreds of 
                                                            
2
 M. Broom, D. Collins, H. Vu and P. Thomas, 'The Four Regions in Settlement Space: A Game-
Theoretical Approach to Investment Treaty Arbitration. Part II: Cases', Journal of Law, Probability and 
Risk, Vol. xx, No. yy (20zz) 
3 See e.g. R Dolzer and C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 
2012) at 235-238 and D Collins, An Introduction to International Investment Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2016) at 214-249 
4 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014 at xxiii 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf> 
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millions of dollars (for the respondent governments).  Such expenses do not capture other 
intangible and often unquantifiable risks associated with international litigation, such as 
damage to a government’s reputation as a safe place for doing business. Non-compliance 
with international law (as embodied by the violation of an investment treaty guarantee) 
generates reputation costs, inhibiting other states from cooperating with that state in the 
future and undermining its capacity to attract capital.5 Argentina, the most common 
respondent in ISDS, is a good example of this phenomenon. Such risks can be further 
contextualized in that host states are developing countries with limited financial resources 
facing severe competition for scarce capital among often highly mobile firms. For the 
firms themselves, their resources are largely sunk at the point of litigation and the 
reputational effects of international arbitration are minimal, particularly since in many 
(but not all) cases legal costs are small relative to the value of the claims themselves. In 
one third of ISDS cases there was little to no public information provided on the type of 
claimant (size or corporate structure).6 
 
While there is an established tradition of law and economics scholarship in relation to 
litigation strategies for domestic civil adjudication7, there are key differences between 
these traditional fora and that of ISDS which make this study unique. Firstly, in ISDS, 
unlike almost any other forum of dispute settlement, only investors can sue. 
Counterclaims by host states, which are exceedingly rare, are typically brought in 
domestic courts rather than in the same arbitration proceedings. Secondly, as suggested 
above, there are significant reputational consequences which may be faced by defendant 
states which act as repeat players, often sued many times by different investors. Thirdly, 
costs in ISDS may be quite low relative to the value of claims, unlike some domestic 
litigation where costs can act as a significant deterrent. Caution is needed here, however, 
because the spread of relative costs among cases is wide. While one study reported that 
costs in ISDS amounted to less than 2% of amounts claimed8, the analysis reported in this 
paper suggests that litigation costs are highly variable: while legal and administrative 
costs may in many cases constitute a very small proportion of the claim, costs came to 
10% or more of the claim in 45% of the cases (see Section 3.3.3 and Figure 2). Lastly, the 
advantage of confidentiality that is available through settlement in conventional litigation 
is less likely to motivate parties in ISDS because they have the option of full or partial 
confidentiality in arbitration to begin with. In the case of publicly available disputes, both 
                                                            
5 A van Aken, ‘Effectuating Public International Law through Market Mechanisms’ Osgoode Hall Law 
School Research Report No. 34/2008 (2008) at 8 
6 Investor-to-State-Dispute Settlement: Some Facts and Figures, European Commission Report (12 March 
2015) at 4. 
7 E.g. R Cooter and T Ulen, ‘An Economic Theory of the Legal Process’ in Law & Economics (4th ed, 
Pearson, 2004); W Landes, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’ in G Becker and W Landes eds. Essays 
in the Economics of Crime and Punishment (National Bureau of Economics Research, 1974); R Posner, ‘An 
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’ 2 Journal of Legal Studies 399 
(1973); G Priest and B Klein, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’ 13:1 Journal of Legal Studies 1 
(1984); D Rosenberg and S Shavell, ‘A Model in Which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance Value’ 
International Review of Economics (1985) 5, 3; D Gould, ‘The Economics of Legal Conflicts’ 2:2 Journal 
of Legal Studies 279 (1973) 
8 ‘Investor-to-State-Dispute Settlement: Some Facts and Figures’, European Commission Report (12 March 
2015) at 8-9. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153046.pdf . The average claim was 
$622 million with average costs at $8 million. The actual awards averaged $16 million (making costs closer 
to 50% of awards). The link between costs and settlement in civil trials has been identified by others, e.g. R 
Posner, ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’ 2 Journal of Legal 
Studies 399 (1973); S Shavell, ‘Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under the Alternative 
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs’ 11:1 Journal of Legal Studies 55 (1981) 
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parties have chosen to waive this confidentiality, possibly because public attention is 
either a political imperative or because it may be expected to affect outcomes (i.e. 
pressure settlement by the host state). In that sense, confidential settlement is a less 
attractive option in ISDS than it may be in other realms of binding adjudication where 
keeping the dispute out of the public courts may be a primary motivation. This may 
explain why observed regularity of settlement in ISDS (approximately 28% of cases9) is 
considerably lower than that of many domestic civil litigation systems, where some 
studies have shown less than 5% of disputes actually reach trial.10  
 
1.3 Methodology 
We use game theory to represent ISDS as a game in sequential form. We assume that 
each party to the dispute constructs estimates of likely rewards, costs and the probability 
of the claimant winning the dispute. Incorporating these within our game allows us to find 
a unique solution to the game for any given combination of estimates. The actual solution 
will depend upon the utility functions of each party in addition to both sets of estimates 
(i.e. to make the correct choice one party needs to know the estimates of the other party). 
We are then able to apply our model to any specific situation, and consider some of the 
cases from the database in this context.  
 
Following both standard economic theory11 and game theory,12 each of the arbitral 
parties, claimant investor and respondent host state, will be seen as attempting to 
maximize the expected utility of its assets. This will determine the monetary resources it 
can mobilize for the purposes of contesting or defending legal rights through international 
arbitration. Viewing the process as a game played between claimant and respondent, the 
expected utilities provide the key to explaining the likely actions of the two players and 
lead to a general solution. As a game with complete information, the players know 
precisely what moves have been made previously by themselves and the other player, and 
consequently which branch-point or vertex of the "game tree" has been reached.  It is 
reasonable to assume such transparency in the case of ISDS, as the claimant will notify 
the respondent of its intention to pursue the matter in arbitration. 
 
Additional insight is provided by utility theory, which takes into account the fact that the 
different participants may value the different outcomes in very different ways, so that 
choosing a strategy may be about more than simply optimizing the expected financial 
gain.  Utility theory is widely used in the insurance industry13, where it is a commonplace 
that the utility each party sets on a given asset will depend on that party's aversion to risk.  
Risk aversion may be described as a measure of the feeling influencing a person’s 
                                                            
9 ‘Investor-to-State-Dispute Settlement: Some Facts and Figures’, ibid at 7. ICSID Caseload Statistics 2016-
1(June 2016) reported that 36% of ICSID disputes were either settled or the proceedings were otherwise 
discontinued (at 13). This figure includes both settlements embodied in the award and proceedings 
terminated at the request of one or both of the parties, presumably because a confidential settlement was 
reached, as well as terminations initiated by the tribunal itself (at 15). 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/372121468186843932/pdf/106048-NWP-PUBLIC-ICSID-
Web-Stats-2016-1-English-final.pdf 
10 G Priest and B Klein, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’ 13:1 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1984) at 
2. 
11 See, for example, R. G. Lipsey and K. A. Chrystal, An introduction to positive economics, 8th Edition, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (1995) 
12 J von Neumann and O Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, (Princeton Classic 
Editions, 1944, 2007) 
13 R Kaas, M Goovaerts, J Dhaene, M and Denuit, Modern actuarial risk theory, (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001) 
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decision made in the face of uncertain outcomes. These outcomes can be about money or 
happiness or anything else that is important to him/her.14  Risk-aversion15, ε , (given a 
hyphen here to signify its status here as a mathematically defined parameter; see 
Appendix B) is fundamental in determining how much satisfaction or utility we obtain 
from a good or money.   
 
Whether it is a government or firm, the utility of any organization’s assets or wealth is the 
value that the organization places on the assets that it owns. It is important to recognize 
that this may differ from their monetary equivalent, depending on the risk-aversion of the 
organization in question.  For the purposes of this study we will not explore the issue of 
misalignment between the risk aversion of individuals who compose the organization 
(namely shareholders and citizens) as they consider whether or not to engage in 
arbitration.16  Risk assessment in this decision-making will be approached from the 
perspective of the organization as a single entity. 
 
We use utility theory to explore the nature of the problem, including discussion of the 
influence of risk-aversion.  The base model developed in the main text assumes that both 
state and investor are risk neutral in the sense that the risk-aversion is zero for each and so 
money gained or lost is the sole determinant. In one sense this should be viewed as an 
accurate representation of the state’s position, which can normally be expected to have 
large resources. It should also capture the status of most investors which tend to be large, 
well-resourced companies. The settlement amount derived from this model will tend to be 
conservatively large in the case of an investor possessing a positive risk-aversion, 
possible when the investor is a small or medium-sized enterprise. We note, however, that 
we only consider the single quantity of financial return. In reality the participants will 
have other considerations than simply money, for example a state’s reputation as a good 
place to do business.   Such considerations would manifest themselves in a strictly 
positive value of risk-aversion.  While it has been argued in the past that one party to a 
court action would exhibit a strictly positive risk-aversion but that the other would be risk 
neutral17, we go further in this article by considering that either the claimant or the 
respondent or both may develop a non-zero value for risk-aversion, and consider the 
likely effects.  Appendix B discusses ways of extending the analysis in detail to cover 
aversion to risk.  A circumstance is also noted in Appendix C where the behaviour of an 
organisation may be characterised independent of the value of its risk-aversion, a result of 
importance in determining the go-no-go probability for claimant success before the 
                                                            
14 PJ Thomas, ‘The importance of risk-aversion as a measurable psychological parameter governing risk-
taking behavior’, Proc. of the 2013 Joint IMEKO TC1-TC7-TC13 Symposium Measurement across 
physical and behavioural sciences, 4-6 September 2013, Genova, Palazzo Ducale – Italy.  Journal of 
Physics: Conference Series 459 http://iopscience.iop.org/1742-6596/459/1/012052 
15 PJ Thomas, ‘Measuring risk-aversion: The challenge’, Measurement, Volume 79, pages 285–301 (2015)   
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.measurement.2015.07.056 
16 Problems with assessing the decision-making of organizations as opposed to individuals has been noted 
by a number of scholars e.g. C Engel, ‘The Behavior of Corporate Actors: A Survey of Empirical 
Literature’ 6 Journal of Institutional Economics 445 (2010). See further A Sundaram and A Inkpen, ‘The 
Corporate Objective Revisited’ 15:3 Organizational Science 350 (noting different conceptions of wealth 
maximization within a firm).  For a discussion on the application of risk aversion to governance and 
international relations see B O’Neill, ‘Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory’ 45:4 International 
Studies Quarterly 617 (focusing on the decisions of country leaders as individual decision-makers) 
17 W. M. Landes, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’, in Essays in the Economics of Crime and 
Punishment, eds. G. S. Becker and W. M. Landes, p. 164 – 214, (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1974).  Available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c3629 .  Landes suggests that the defendant will have a 
positive risk-aversion, but that the state prosecutor will be risk neutral. 
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tribunal below which the case should not be brought forward. 
 
Because of the large number of mathematical symbols needed to describe a realistic ISDS 
case, a full list and explanation are included in Appendix A, Nomenclature. 
 
2. Game Theoretical modeling 
 
2.1 General overview 
Briefly, game theory is a methodology commonly applied to situations involving multiple 
decision-makers, in particular where their interests are in conflict. It has been used in a 
wide variety of contexts, including sciences such as biology,18 social sciences such as 
economics where it originated19 and law.20 It has been applied to international investment 
law in the context of evaluating strategic options when a country is considering signing an 
IIA for the purposes of attracting investment.21 However, game theory has not yet been 
applied to the strategies underpinning investment arbitration itself. 
 
In game theory, “games" are specified by three key properties: the set of players who play 
the game, the strategies available to the players, and the rewards, termed ‘payoffs’, to the 
players. Each player selects a strategy, and given the strategies chosen the expected 
payoffs to each individual can be determined. In general, an individual may have many 
potential choices to make, and his/her strategy is the full set of choices that he/she would 
make in any conceivable situation. In general, we seek Nash equilibrium strategies where 
no player can improve its payoff by a unilateral change in strategy. 
   
2.2 Games in extensive form 
A game in extensive form is one governed by a sequence of moves, where at each point 
the move is made by one of the players, or by chance (i.e. a probability is allocated to 
each possible outcome). Such a game may be represented by a tree (see Figure 1), where 
the game starts at an initial branch-point or vertex known as the root. The game proceeds 
from the root vertex, following a path through the tree governed by the choice of the 
players or random moves, until it ends at one of the terminal vertices, at which the 
payoffs allocated to each player are decided. 
 
Sensible strategies for such games (which may be optimal in some sense) can be 
determined using backwards induction, i.e. starting at the vertices nearest the terminal 
vertices, and having decided upon the optimal choices at this point, moving backwards 
towards the root vertex. In simpler terms, we can derive reasonable strategies for investor 
and host state in a given situation when contemplating bringing or defending an 
arbitration claim respectively, by working backwards from generalized outcomes. 
 
3. Model development and general analysis 
 
3.1 The game tree 
In this section we will outline how the arbitration strategies can be modelled for the 
                                                            
18 M Broom and J Rychtar, Game-Theoretical Models in Biology (Taylor and Francis, 2013) and J Maynard 
Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge University Press, 1982) 
19 von Neumann and O Morgenstern, above n 12 
20 D Baird, Game Theory and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 1994) 
21 E.g. A Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 639 (1998) 
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purposes of game theory analysis via a ‘game tree’ which captures the various choices 
and outcomes at each stage.  Figure 1 shows the game tree for our extensive form game. 
The root node X denotes the start of the game, where the claimant must decide whether to 
bring the case forward or not, meaning to initiate a formal claim through the ISDS 
provisions of an IIA or investment contract with the host state. If it does not bring the 
case forward, there is no further action, and there is no reallocation of resources (i.e. the 
payoff to each party is zero). If the claimant decides to bring the case forward, we reach 
vertex Y, where the respondent must choose whether to contest the claim, or to attempt to 
pursue a settlement, either through conciliation or some other means. Vertex Y differs 
from the other vertices in that here the active “player” is not required simply to make a 
binary choice, but to decide from a continuum of possible offers which one to make. 
 
We present this as the respondent making a single offer of a settlement sum of value v to 
the claimant at vertex Y  (a respondent wishing to contest the case will make a settlement 
offer of 0).  The claimant at vertex Zv can either accept or decline the offer. Acceptance of 
the offer by the claimant leads to rewards or “payoffs” to the claimant and respondent of 
1vA  and 2vA  respectively.  
 
If the claimant declines the offer then the matter will proceed to the arbitration stage 
involving a tribunal, vertex P.  The outcome of the arbitration is obviously out of the 
control of either player22.  The tribunal's verdict will depend on extraneous factors 
including most notably the strength of each party’s legal claims and cannot be predicted 
with certainty, so that it must be treated as a chance event (represented by a circle in 
Figure 1).  The tribunal decides in favour of the claimant (with payoffs, 1B  and 2B , to the 
claimant and the respondent respectively) with probability p , and in favour of the 
respondent (with payoffs, 1C  and 2C , respectively) with probability equal to 1-p. 
 
3.2 Evaluating the payoffs 
In what follows, the subscript 1 will be used to denote properties or characteristics of the 
claimant, while the subscript 2 will denote those of the respondent.  We will assume that 
both claimant and respondent are able to estimate accurately the B-payoffs, 1 2 and B B , 
which occur when the claimant wins, and the C-payoffs, 1 2 and C C , which come into 
force when the claimant loses. 
 
Figure 1, which shows the game tree, is also marked up with the incremental costs 
incurred at each vertex for the two parties, where the index i is used to identify the party, 
with 1=i  denoting the claimant while 2=i  denotes the correspondent.  Referring to this 
figure, the claimant will no doubt incur some costs up to the point marked X in 
considering whether or not to bring the case, likely by engaging counsel for an initial 
opinion as to the merits of the claim, but these will be common to all routes through the 
decision tree including that of dropping the case (path 2x ).  Thus these costs may be 
subsumed in the claimant's assets or wealth, 1W , just before vertex X.  The respondent's 
wealth just before vertex X will be 2W .  The respondent's wealth at this point will not be 
affected by the claimant’s possible decision to pursue a claim, since it would not know 
about such a decision until after vertex X has been passed. 
                                                            
22 We do not consider here specific litigation strategies which are within the control of the parties such as 
the choice of specific legal arguments, the selection of counsel or of tribunal members. 
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A decision to take the case forward (path x1 in Figure 1) will lead to extra expenses being 
incurred by the claimant and new expenses by the respondent.  These ‘pre-arbitration 
tribunal legal expenses’, will be called 1PTE , where the subscript, 'PT1', stands for 'pre-
tribunal for party 1', where party 1 denotes the claimant.   
 
If the claimant follows path 1x  , then the respondent will need to decide, at vertex Y, the 
sum of money, v, it should offer in settlement.  No such offer corresponds to 0v = .  The 
process now moves via path vy   to the vertex Zv, where the claimant needs to decide on 
whether or not to accept the offer.  The associated paths are marked 1vz , signifying 
acceptance, and 2vz , the latter denoting the claimant’s decision to reject the offer and 
proceed to the tribunal. 
 
The claimant following path 1vz  will experience a gain or payoff of 1vA , relative to wealth 
at X, 1W , where: 
 
1 1v PTA v E= −   (1) 
 
Meanwhile the respondent will experience a (negative) gain or payoff, 2vA , relative to 
wealth at X, 2W , where: 
 
2 2v PTA v E= − −   (2) 
 
Bringing the case to arbitration, path 2vz , will incur additional legal costs for the tribunal, 
TiE  for party i, where, in line with the convention adopted above, i = 1 denotes the 
claimant and i = 2 the respondent.  The full legal costs for each of the two parties will 
then be the sum of pre-tribunal and at-tribunal legal costs: 
 
TiPTii EEE +=   i = 1, 2  (3) 
 
Let AiE be the arbitration costs assigned to each party in the tribunal judgement (the 
award stage).  The total arbitration costs will be the sum of these two costs: 
 
21 AAA EEE +=   (4) 
 
If the claimant wins its case, path 1p , the tribunal will order the respondent to pay a 
compensation award, CS , to the claimant.  In addition, it may require the respondent to 
pay some fraction, 2f : 10 2 ≤≤ f , of the claimant's total legal costs, 1E , leaving the latter 
with a residual cost burden of ( ) 121 Ef− .  Hence the claimant will experience a gain or 
payoff, 1B , relative to wealth at X, 1W ,  given by: 
 
( ) 1211 1 EfESB AC −−−=   (5) 
 
while the respondent’s (negative) gain, relative to wealth at X, 2W , will be: 
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12222 EfEESB AC −−−−=   (6) 
 
If the claimant loses its case, no award will be made, and, moreover, the claimant may be 
asked to pay some fraction, 1f : 10 1 ≤≤ f , of the respondent’s legal expenses, 2E .  Hence 
the claimant’s (negative) gain, 1C , relative to wealth at X, 1W , will then be: 
 
21111 EfEEC A −−−=   (7) 
 
while the respondent’s gain, 2C , relative to wealth at X, 2W , will be: 
 
( ) 2122 1 EfEC A −−−=   (8) 
 
2C  will often be negative, indicating a cost to the respondent.  However, in the 
respondent's best-case scenario, the arbitral tribunal will order the claimant to pay all the 
arbitration costs, possibly because the claim was wholly lacking in legal merit: AA EE =1 , 
implying 02 =AE , and, moreover, require the claimant to pay all the respondent's legal 
costs, implying 11 =f .  In this scenario, the best as far as the respondent is concerned, 
02 =C . 
 
It is illuminating to sum the payoffs of claimant and respondent for the three cases where 
the case is brought forward (ending in paths 
1vz , 1p  and 2p  in Figure 1).  In the case of a 
settlement (path 
1vz ), adding equations (1) and (2) gives 
 
2121 PTPT EEAA −−=+   (9) 
 
signifying that the overall cost to the two parties is simply the sum of the pre-tribunal 
costs.  In the case where the case goes to arbitration and the claimant wins, path 
1p ,  
adding equations (5) and (6) gives 
 
totalA EEEEBB −=−−−=+ 2121   (10) 
 
where totalE  is the sum of both parties’ legal and arbitration costs.  In the case where the 
respondent wins, path 
2p , adding equations (7) and (8) gives the same result: 
 
totalA EEEECC −=−−−=+ 2121   (11) 
 
Combining equations (10) and (11) yields: 
 
2121 CCBB +=+    (12) 
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3.3  Solving the game using backwards induction 
 
3.3.1  Vertex P; conservation of money when the case goes before the tribunal 
 
Let the claimant’s change in wealth after the tribunal be TW1∆ , where T indicates the 
decision taken by the arbitration tribunal, and the notation ( )yx  indicates that the value of 
the variable, x, is that pertaining given that the action, y, has occurred.  The change in 
wealth is measured relative to its value, 1W , just before vertex X.   
 
In a similar way, the respondent’s wealth will change by 
2W T∆  from the value, 2W , it 
had just before vertex X.  Since the total costs (each party's legal fees and tribunal 
expenses), totalE , will be funded entirely by one or both of claimant and the respondent 
and not from any outside source, conservation of money requires that: 
 
1 2 0totalW T W T E∆ + ∆ + =   (13) 
 
The tribunal’s decision, T, will be uncertain in advance to both parties, and hence may be 
modelled reasonably as a random variable.  While both TW1∆  and 2W T∆  will thus be 
random variables also, the expenses term, totalE , will be independent of T.  Thus applying 
the expectation operator, ( ).E , to equation (13) gives: 
 
( ) ( )1 2 0totalE W T E W T E∆ + ∆ + =   (14) 
 
Since the legal and tribunal expenses will never be zero in practice, equation (14) 
demonstrates that the tribunal process will not constitute a zero-sum game between 
claimant and respondent.  Equation (14) will prove useful in defining relationships 
between the payoffs to the claimant, 11,CB , and to the respondent, 2 2,B C . 
 
Referring to Figure 1, ( )1E W T∆  will be the sum of the products of each of the 
claimant’s possible payoffs, 
1B  on winning, 1C  on losing, weighted by its probability of 
occurrence, p and 1 – p respectively: 
 
( ) ( ) 111 1 CppBTWE −+=∆     (15) 
 
where p is the probability of the claimant succeeding at the tribunal.   
 
In an analogous way, the respondent’s expected change in wealth, ( )2E W T∆ , is given 
by: 
 
( ) ( ) 222 1 CppBTWE −+=∆     (16) 
 
  
11 
 
3.3.2  Vertex Zv 
 
Having reached vertex Zv, the claimant will be in receipt of the respondent’s offer, v .  
The claimant’s criterion for acceptance may be stated most generally in terms of utility 
(see Appendix B for an introduction to utility and related equations).  The offer will be 
judged favourably only if it is sufficient to render the claimant's change in utility under 
settlement, 1u S∆ , at least as much as the expected change in the claimant's utility if the 
case went before the tribunal, ( )1E u T∆ :  
 
( )1 1u S E u T∆ ≥ ∆     (17) 
 
We will assume, in the base model, that the claimant is risk neutral, so that its risk-
aversion, 1ε , will be zero.    Risk neutrality implies that the claimant's change in utility 
will be the same as its change in wealth, an assumption that will be reasonable when the 
amount of money being sought represents only a small fraction of the claimant’s wealth.  
Hence 
 
1 1u S W S∆ = ∆     (18) 
 
and 
 
( ) ( )1 1E u T E W T∆ = ∆    (19) 
 
By the definition of the claimant’s payoff under settlement, 
 
1 1vA W S= ∆      (20) 
 
so that combining equations (15), (18), (19) and (20) with inequality (17) gives: 
 
( )1 1 11vA pB p C≥ + −    (21) 
 
Applying equation (1) to inequality (21) allows a minimum offer level, minv , to be 
established: 
 
( )min 1 1 11 PTv v pB p C E≥ = + − +    (22) 
 
The claimant should reject any settlement, v , that is less than minv  since a risk neutral 
claimant could expect better from the tribunal. However, if no negotiation is allowed and 
the respondent makes a single “take it or leave it” offer, following the game tree in Figure 
1, then any offer of minv  or greater should be accepted. 
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3.3.3 Vertex Y 
 
The respondent needs to decide, at vertex Y, the size of the settlement offer, v, it should 
make to the claimant, where the range of possible v will include zero, equivalent to the 
absence of an offer.   
 
The respondent may identify two constraints in making an offer: 
 
(i) the respondent’s offer, v , must be sufficient to satisfy inequality (22) 
 
(ii) the respondent will wish its change in utility under settlement, 2u S∆ , to be at least as 
much as its expected change in utility if the case were to go before the tribunal:  
 
( )2 2u S E u T∆ ≥ ∆     (23) 
 
The condition of risk neutrality assumed for the respondent in the base case implies 
 
2 2u S W S∆ = ∆     (24) 
 
and 
 
 ( ) ( )2 2E u T E W T∆ = ∆    (25) 
 
The respondent’s change in wealth, 2W S∆ , is shown in Figure 1 as the payoff to the 
Respondent under settlement: 
 
2 2vA W S= ∆      (26) 
 
Equations (16), (24), (25) and (26) may now be combined with inequality (23) to give 
 
( )2 2 21vA pB p C≥ + −    (27) 
 
Substituting from equation (2) into inequality (27) gives the second constraint on the 
settlement sum to be offered by the respondent 
 
( )max 2 2 21 PTv v pB p C E≤ = − − − −    (28) 
 
The respondent would not be advised to offer any more than maxv  in settlement, as a better 
outcome could be expected from the tribunal. 
 
We may compare the limiting values, maxv  and minv , using the equations associated with 
the conservation of money.  Combining equations (14), (15) and (16): 
 
( ) ( )2 2 1 11 1 totalpB p C pB p C E+ − = − − − −   (29) 
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Substituting from equation (29) into equation (28) gives 
 
( )
( )
( )
max 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2
2
1 1 1
1
1
1
1
total PT
A PT T PT T PT
A PT Ti
i
v pB p C E E
pB p C E E E E E E
pB p C E E E
=
= + − + −
= + − + + + + + −
= + − + + +∑
   (30) 
 
Comparing equations (23) and (30), it is clear that maxv  is greater than minv  at any given 
value of claimant success probability, p, by an amount equal to the total arbitration costs, 
AE , plus the sum of both parties’ at-tribunal legal fees, 1 2T TE E+ :  
 
2
max min
1
A Ti
i
v v E E
=
= + +∑    (31) 
 
Thus the respondent will indeed be willing to offer minv , and since the claimant would 
accept this, then that is the offer that should be made. 
 
The disparity illustrated by equation (31) occurs because the additional cost of holding 
the tribunal means that there is a range of offer levels where both respondent and claimant 
would achieve a higher reward from the associated settlement than the expected reward 
that they would receive from going to the tribunal. This may be demonstrated by 
subtracting the claimant’s expected payoff, ( )1E W T∆ , from the negative of the 
respondent’s payoff, ( )2E W T− ∆   using equations (15) and (16): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1E W T E W T p C B C p C B C− ∆ − ∆ = − − − − −  (32) 
 
But from equation (12), 2 2 1 1C B B C− = − , while from equation (11), 2 1 totalC C E− − = .  
Hence 
 
( ) ( )2 1 0totalE W T E W T E− ∆ − ∆ = >     (33) 
 
In plain terms, the difference, totalE , between minv and maxv is a direct result of the 
respondent expecting to lose more than the claimant can expect to gain. 
 
The size of the difference between them will vary considerably from case to case.  For the 
25 cases considered in Part II for which a claim was declared, the distribution of the 
ratio, ATCr : 
 
total arbitration and at-tribunal fees
claim
ATCr =    (34) 
 
has a substantial mean, 0.60, but a very large standard deviation of 1.92.  The distribution 
has a median of 0.082 and is approximately lognormal with a long tail, see Figure 2.  It 
may be deduced that while the sum of the arbitration and at-tribunal legal costs can be 
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negligible in many cases, in others these costs can be highly significant: at least 10% of 
the claim for about 45% of claims, based on data from Table 1 of Part II. 
 
3.3.4  Vertex X 
 
The claimant must decide at vertex X whether or not to bring the case forward.  It knows 
that it cannot control the behaviour of the respondent, and it cannot assume that the 
respondent will make a satisfactory settlement offer.  Thus the claimant will pursue its 
case only if it expects that its utility will rise as a result of the verdict of the arbitration 
tribunal: ( )1 0E u T∆ > .  It is shown in Appendix C that ( )1 0E u T∆ >  implies 
( )1 0E W T∆ >  not only for the risk neutral case ( 0ε = ), but also for any positive risk-
aversion.  Hence it is sufficient under rather general conditions to stipulate that the 
claimant should pursue its claim only if: 
 
( )1 0E W T∆ >    (35) 
 
Combining this condition along with equation (15) above gives the condition: 
 
( ) 01 11 >−+ CppB     (36) 
 
so that  
 
( ) 111 CCBp −>−   (37) 
 
Since the claimant’s payoff on winning its case at the tribunal will be positive: 01 >B , 
while its payoff on losing will be negative: 01 <C , it follows that 011 >−CB .  Hence 
inequality (36) may be rearranged to: 
 
1
1 1
*
C
p p
C B
= >
−
   (38) 
 
This means that the claimant will proceed only if its probability of success before the 
tribunal is greater than the go-no-go value, *p , the probability of claimant victory below 
which it would not be reasonable for a potential claimant to proceed. 
 
The value *p , given in equation (38) in terms of the claimant’s tribunal payoffs may also 
be expressed in terms of the respondent's payoffs by noting from equation (12) that  
 
( )2211 BCBC −−=−    (39) 
 
while from equation (11): 
 
( )21 CEC total +−=   (40) 
 
Substituting from equations (39) and (40) into inequality (38) gives: 
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2
2 2
* total
E C
p p
C B
+
> =
−
   (41) 
 
Calculating  *p  in this way requires the respondent to estimate only its own payoffs 
having won or lost at the tribunal, 2C  and 2B  respectively, as well as making an 
assessment of the legal and arbitration costs to be borne by the two parties. 
 
3.4  The settlement space 
 
The theory developed above allows the settlement space to be divided as shown in Figure 
3, which plots the respondent’s offer, v, against the claimant’s success probability, p.  The 
space is partitioned into 4 regions, numbered 1 to 4. 
 
Region 1:  the claimant will not bring the case forward if it estimates its probability of 
success to be less than the go-no-go probability,  p*. 
 
Region 2: the respondent will not make an offer above maxv . 
 
Region 3: the claimant will not accept an offer below minv . 
 
Region 4: the existence of Region 4 is a consequence of the process not being a zero sum 
game, as discussed in Section 3.3.3. If both parties are risk neutral, so that only the 
monetary outcome matters, and the game sequence follows Figure 1, then any successful 
settlement will lie on the line of minv  versus p. This raises two questions. Firstly why 
would a settlement occur that did not lie on this line?  We will address this issue in 
Section 3.5.  Secondly, why would any case go to the tribunal rather than reach a 
settlement? We will address this point at the beginning of Part II. 
 
Figure 3 represents the general solution for settlement under ISDS. 
 
The analysis is obviously idealized in that it assumes that both the claimant and 
respondent are able to estimate the various parameters accurately.  Nevertheless its 
identification of 4 distinct regions defining the settlement space in the plane of (p, v) 
provides a novel and useful framework for evaluating the problems facing both claimant 
and respondent when contemplating a settlement.  We shall apply the new analysis results 
to real data in Part II of this paper. 
 
3.5  Effect of non-zero risk-aversions on the inclination to settle 
 
3.5.1  The claimant 
 
It is possible for the claimant to have a risk-aversion greater than zero.  In general terms, 
the claimant’s risk-aversion, 1ε , will rise significantly above zero when the size of the 
potential arbitration award is comparable with its wealth.23  Estimation of 1ε will require a 
                                                            
23
 P. J. Thomas, R. D. Jones and W. J. O. Boyle, 2010, ‘The limits to risk aversion. Part 2: The permission 
point and examples’, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Vol. 88, No. 6, November, pages 396 – 
406; I. Waddington, W. J. O. Boyle and J. Kearns, 2013, ‘Computing the Limits of Risk Aversion’, Process 
Safety and Environmental Protection, Vol. 91, Nos. 1 – 2, pages 92–100. doi:10.1016/j.psep.2012.03.003 
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prior estimation of the claimant’s assets, possible in the case where the claimant is a 
publicly listed company.  Inequality (17) will still be satisfied when the claimant has a 
positive risk-aversion even though inequality (22) will not: the claimant’s gain in utility 
will render it content to accept a settlement sum less than minv .  Obviously an aware 
respondent could take advantage of this situation by issuing a lower settlement offer.  
 
On the other hand, the difference between minv and maxv might have a complicating effect 
on the claimant’s strategy on whether or not to accept the respondent’s offer.  Suppose 
that the respondent offers a settlement sum, minv .  If the offer is a one-off and the 
claimant’s risk-aversion is zero, it ought logically to accept, since the alternative would 
be to go before the tribunal, where the claimant could not expect to do better.   
 
However, suppose that the offer is not a one-off. This would correspond to the process in 
Figure 1 being extended to allow for negotiation at vertex Zv, making it possible that the 
respondent would make a second offer. The claimant’s estimates of the costs and legal 
fees associated with the case would enable it to calculate that the respondent could be 
pushed harder while still complying with its “red-line” condition, maxv v≤ .  The 
realisation that the respondent has some margin in hand might conceivably lead the 
claimant to reject a settlement offer of minv .    But even in this case the claimant cannot be 
certain, when refusing minv  as  a settlement, that the respondent will make an improved 
offer, and here the details of the negotiation process would be crucial.  This will be 
discussed at the beginning of Part II of the paper.  But the only guaranteed alternative is 
to pursue a claim before the arbitration tribunal, and the claimant is turning down an offer 
equal to its expected tribunal payoff.  To reject such an offer, the claimant might need to 
become at least marginally risk confident rather than risk neutral.  While the claimant 
might be succesful in winning a better result from the tribunal, it is nevertheless clear that 
the strategy is riskier (and with a no better expected return) than accepting minv . 
 
3.5.2.  The respondent 
 
It is reasonable to assume in most cases that the respondent’s potential loss would be a 
small fraction of its total assets, making it likely that the respondent should be risk 
neutral, with 2 0ε = .  This would predispose the respondent to making an offer of minv  in 
settlement.   
 
However, as noted in Section 1.3, there might be factors that would lead to the respondent 
adopting a higher risk-aversion.  For example, the rapid closing out of a case through 
early settlement could reduce the potential for bad publicity that might accompany a 
tribunal case, a consideration of greater significance in recent times because of growing 
pressure to waive confidentiality of proceedings combined with heightened media 
scrutiny over ISDS.  The respondent state might also wish to avoid a clear adverse 
judgement by an international arbiter, since both the fact of the negative judgement and 
the text accompanying that judgement might bring significant reputational damage over 
and above the direct financial loss, jeopardizing future inward foreign investment. 
 
The disparity between minv  and maxv  might influence the risk averse respondent (for 
which now 2 0ε > ) to make a settlement offer above minv  and closer to maxv .  But while a 
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significantly risk averse respondent might be inclined to offer more than maxv , it would 
almost certainly be restrained from doing so by its duty as custodian of public funds.  A 
higher offer might be interpreted by polical opponents as a gross waste of public money.  
Hence maxv  may be regarded in practice as the absolute maximum offer that the 
respondent will make. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
This article has applied game theory to develop a model of the process of international 
arbitration between investors and host states under international investment law.  
Attention is drawn thereby to the strategic issues and associated decisions facing the two 
parties to the dispute.   
 
The development of the settlement space diagram provides a new and easily understood 
conceptualisation of the economic principles behind the strategy of investor-state dispute 
settlement through which the structure of the settlement problem is laid bare.  
Furthermore, the mathematical framework developed here allows data available from 
previous arbitration cases to be organised into a usable model that can offer both claimant 
investors and respondent states benchmarks against which to judge their respective 
arbitration strategies when allegations of treaty breach are made. 
 
The method presented in this article should be of immediate interest to a respondent state 
seeking guidance on the size of the offer it should make to a claimant with a reasonable 
expectation of acceptance.  By the same token, the method should be of value to potential 
claimants considering taking a case to international arbitration through fora such as 
ICSID. 
 
Part II of this paper applies the model developed here to a selection of ISDS cases that 
went to arbitration between 2012 and 2014. 
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Appendix A.  Nomenclature used in Part I 
 
Symbol Meaning 
A positive constant 
Av1 claimant payoff on accepting offer, v 
Av2 respondent payoff on having offer, v, accepted 
B constant 
B1 claimant payoff after winning at the tribunal 
B2 respondent payoff after claimant wins at the tribunal 
C claimant (label in Figure 1) 
C1 claimant payoff after losing at the tribunal 
C2 respondent payoff after claimant loses at the tribunal 
E1 claimant's total legal fees (pre-tribunal and at-tribunal) 
E2 respondent's total legal fees (pre-tribunal and at-tribunal) 
EA arbitration costs 
EA1 arbitration costs borne by the claimant 
EA2 arbitration costs borne by the respondent 
EPT1 claimant pre-tribunal legal fees 
EPT2 respondent pre-tribunal legal fees 
ET1 claimant at-tribunal legal fees 
ET2 respondent at-tribunal legal fees 
Etotal total legal fees and arbitration costs 
f1 fraction of the respondent's legal expenses borne by the claimant 
f2 fraction of the claimant's legal expenses borne by the respondent 
M rate of change of utility with wealth 
P vertex representing the judgment of the tribunal 
p claimant's probability of winning at the tribunal 
p* lowest probability of the claimant winning at the tribunal that will allow 
the claimant to bring its case forward 
p1 game tree path when claimant wins at tribunal 
p2 game tree path when claimant loses at tribunal 
R respondent (label in Figure 1) 
rATC ratio: ( )total arbitration and at-tribunal cf es me lai÷   
S settlement 
SC tribunal award 
T tribunal decision 
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u(.) utility 
v settlement offer 
vmax absolute maximum settlement offer 
vmin maximum settlement offer made by a risk neutral respondent 
W wealth 
X 1st vertex on game tree, where the claimant decides whether or not to 
bring the case forward 
x1 game tree path followed when the claimant decides to bring case 
forward 
x2 game tree path followed when the claimant decides not to bring case 
forward 
Y vertex at which the respondent decides on what size offer to make 
yv path connecting vertex Y to vertex, Zv 
Zv vertex at which the claimant decides on whether or not to accept the 
offer, v 
zv1 path to settlement when the claimant accepts offer, v 
zv2 path to tribunal when the claimant rejects offer, v 
ε   risk-aversion 
1ε   claimant's risk-aversion 
2ε  respondent's risk-aversion 
 
 
Appendix B.  The use of utility as an indicator of satisfaction 
 
In the most general statement of the problem, each of the arbitral parties, claimant 
investor and respondent host state, will be seen as attempting to maximize the expected 
utility of its assets.  Whether it is a government or firm, the utility, ( )Wu , of any 
organization’s assets or wealth, W, is the value that the organization places on the assets 
that it owns. It is important to recognize that this may differ from their monetary 
equivalent, depending on the risk-aversion, ε , of the organization in question.   
 
A rise in risk-aversion above zero, 01 >ε , renders the utility function non-linear and 
concave, a situation envisaged by von Neumann and Morgenstern.  Those authors pointed 
out24 that, for the case where options, B, A, and C are put in that order of preference by an 
individual, then a numerical measure of utility can be obtained by eliciting a further piece 
of information, namely the probability, p , at which he/she would be prepared to accept a 
probabilistic combination of B and C as equivalent to option A.  The individual’s 
indifference between option A and the probabilistic combination of options B and C 
produces an equality in expected utility: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1E u A pu B p u C= + −   (B.1) 
 
where ( ).u  is the utility function used to calculate the person’s utility from the option.  
The right-hand side of equation (B.1) may be recognised as the expected utility of the 
probabilistic offering of options B and C.   
 
                                                            
24 von Neumann and Morgenstern, above n 12 
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Equation (B.1) may be applied to the current problem by identifying option B as the 
claimant's change in utility of wealth after a win at the arbitration tribunal and option C as 
the change in its utility of wealth if the case is lost.  Analogously defined options B and C 
may represent the respondent's changes in utility of wealth when the claimant wins and 
loses respectively. 
 
Application of equation (B.1) requires a utility function to be found with the appropriate 
value of risk-aversion, ε .  It has been argued that the ‘Power family’ of utility functions, 
with risk-aversion, ε , as sole parameter, is the only class of utility functions that 
conforms to what is the necessary condition for a decision, namely that the risk-aversion 
of the decision maker remains unchanged during the course of his/her making the 
decision.25  This is because risk-aversion depends on the wealth of the decision maker or, 
by extension, that of his/her organization.  This wealth will not change during the short 
time when the decision is being taken, even if the decision will lead to a different wealth 
being held in the future.  It is the current wealth that will inevitably inform the decision 
being taken.  Of the Power utility functions, the Atkinson version of equation (B.2) below 
offers the advantage that it can cope with the full range of risk-aversions, in particular 
risk-aversions numerically higher than 1.0, corresponding to a high degree of caution.  
The Atkinson utility function is defined by: 
 
( )







=
≠
−
−
=
−
1for          ln
1for    
1
11
ε
ε
ε
ε
W
W
Wu   (B.2) 
 
The form of ( )Wu  conforms to the necessary conditions that utility should be both 
monotonically increasing in wealth and concave when 0≥ε .  The latter condition 
provides a good model of normal human behaviour and embodies the “law of diminishing 
returns”, viz. successive increments in wealth lead to progressively lower increases in 
utility.  It is possible, however, for risk-aversion to be negative, with the person or 
organisation possessing this characteristic being risk confident as opposed to risk averse 
or risk neutral. 
 
Risk-aversion,ε , is dimensionless, which means that it is a general parameter that can 
explain the desire to reduce risk to wealth whether that wealth is expressed in UK pounds, 
US dollars or Japanese yen, for example.  It is a normalized derivative in the sense 
defined by equation (B.3): 
 
dW
dm
m
W
−=ε      (B.3) 
 
where m is the rate of change of utility with wealth, expressed mathematically as the 
derivative: udWdum ′== , so that 
                                                            
25 PJ Thomas, ‘An absolute scale for measuring the utility of money’, Proc. 13th IMEKO TC1-TC7 Joint 
Symposium Without Measurement no Science, without Science no Measurement ,  1-3 September 2010, City 
University London, UK, IOP Publishing, Journal of Physics: Conference Series 238 (2010) 012039 
doi:10.1088/1742-6596/238/1/012039. Also PJ Thomas, 2015, ‘Measuring risk-aversion: The challenge’, 
Measurement, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.measurement.2015.07.056 
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( )
( )Wu
Wu
W
′
′′
−=ε    (B.4) 
 
It has been shown that when the amount of wealth at risk is small compared with the 
organization's assets, then 0→ε , which implies from equation (B.2) that 
( ) WWWu ≈−→ 1 , so that the utility is then the same as the wealth.  On the other hand, 
risk-aversion can climb to very high levels, 1>>ε , when a large fraction of the 
organization’s assets is at risk.26  
 
The gain in utility, iu∆ , for each party will depend on which outcome occurs: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
                    in an out-of-court settlement
             if the Claimant wins the arbitration
            if the Claimant loses the arbitration
i vi i
i i i i
i i i
u W A u W
u u W B u W
u W C u W
 + −

∆ = + −
 + −
  (B.5) 
 
So called “gains” may be negative, indicating a loss, as well as positive.  
 
Clearly an important factor influencing both the respondent and the claimant is the 
perceived probability of the claimant winning, p .27  This enters the model via the 
expected change in utility of each of the parties: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
i i i i i i i
i i i i i
E u T p u W B u W p u W C u W
pu W B p u W C u W
∆ = + − + − + −
= + + − + −
 (B.6) 
 
Meanwhile the expected change in utility for each party if it decides to pursue settlement 
becomes deterministic. In other words, the element of chance has been removed, so that 
there is no reference to probability in equation (B.7) below: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )i i vi iE u S u W A u W∆ = + − . (B.7) 
 
where S denotes the action of proceeding to an out of court settlement.  The party should 
seek or accept a settlement if 
 
                                                            
26 PJ Thomas, RD Jones and WJO Boyle, ‘The limits to risk aversion: Part 1. The point of indiscriminate 
decision’, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Vol. 88, No. 6, November, pages 381 – 395. 
(2010); PJ Thomas, RD Jones and WJ O Boyle, ‘The limits to risk aversion.  Part  2: The permission point 
and examples’, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Vol. 88, No. 6, November, pages 396 – 406. 
(2010) ;  PJ Thomas, and RD Jones, ‘Extending the J-value framework for safety analysis to include the 
environmental costs of a large accident’, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Vol. 88,  No. 5, 
September, pages 297 – 317 (2010); I Waddington, WJO Boyle, and J Kearns, ‘Computing the Limits of 
Risk Aversion’, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 91, 92–100 (2013). 
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2012.03.003 
27 In addition to the perceived chances of victory, the respondent government may be motivated by the 
political gains from appearing to contest a claim vigorously rather than being seen to capitulate in a 
settlement.  These factors of course depend on the extent of public attention tied to the dispute, which may 
be null where the dispute has remained entirely confidential. 
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( ) ( )i iE u S E u T∆ ≥ ∆  (B.8) 
 
The equality condition included in inequality (B.8) reflects the fact that a settlement will 
generally be the simpler process. The process of achieving settlement itself tends to be 
less costly than that of litigation in many domestic civil justice systems.28  Hence 
settlement is generally to be preferred even when the monetary and therefore utility 
outcomes are indistinguishable.  From equations (B.6) and (B.7), inequality (B.8) is 
equivalent to the condition 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1i vi i i i iu W A pu W B p u W C+ ≥ + + − + .  (B.9) 
 
Using equation (B.1), and assuming 1≠ε , inequality (B.9) may be recast as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
i i i
i vi i i i i
i i i
W A W B W C
p p
ε ε ε
ε ε ε
− − −
+ − + − + −
≥ + −
− − −
  (B.10) 
 
When the respondent’s risk-aversion is less than unity, 1iε < , this reduces to 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 11 1 1 1i i ii vi i i i iW A p W B p W Cε ε ε− − −+ − ≥ + − + − + −  (B.11) 
 
In the risk neutral case, 0iε =  and so 
 
( )1vi i iA pB p C≥ + −     (B.12) 
 
Putting i = 1, 2 produces inequalities (21) and (27) in the main text. 
 
Appendix C.  Expected change in utility and expected change wealth 
 
Because of the need to distinguish compactly in this appendix between variables that are 
subject to uncertainty and those that are not, the common convention will be adopted that 
a random variable is given an upper case letter while deterministic variables are written in 
lower case.  In line with this usage, let the claimant have starting wealth, 1w , and let it 
consider going before a tribunal that will leave it with wealth, TW1 .  It will regard its 
post-tribunal wealth, TW1 , as a random variable, since, while it may increase its chance 
of success by the power of its arguments, the final judgment will obviously be that of the 
arbiters.  The change in the claimant’s wealth, TW1∆ , will be given by: 
 
111 wTWTW −=∆   (C.1) 
 
                                                            
28 In an early study on economic analysis of litigation strategy it was suggested that only one dispute in ten 
proceeds to litigation partly because of this reason: R Cooter and D Rubinfeld, ‘Economic Analysis of 
Legal Disputes and their Resolution’ 27 Journal of Economic Literature 1067 at 1070 (1989), although as 
suggested in the introduction the value of settlement over litigation may be less applicable to ISDS because 
parties do not need to settle to achieve confidentiality since confidentiality is built into the process. 
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which will also be a random variable.  Applying the expectation operator, ( ).E , gives: 
 
( ) ( ) 111 wTWETWE −=∆   (C.2) 
 
The claimant’s starting utility will be ( )1wu  and its utility after appearing before the 
tribunal will be ( )TWu 1 , which could be higher or lower than ( )1wu , depending on 
whether the claimant wins or loses.  The change in utility will be ( )TWu 1∆ , given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )111 wuTWuTWu −=∆   (C.3) 
 
The expectation of the change in utility is 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )111 wuTWuETWuE −=∆  (C.4) 
 
The claimant may be assumed to be either risk averse, in which case the risk-aversion, ε , 
will be strictly positive, or risk neutral, in which case 0=ε  and the utility is a positive 
linear transformation of wealth: ( ) bawwu += 11 ; 0>a .  The requirement that a  is 
positive reflects the general requirement that utility be a monotonically increasing 
function of wealth.  Substituting ( ) bawwu += 11  into equation (C.4) gives: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )11111 wTWEabawbTaWETWuE −=+−+=∆  (C.5) 
 
Substituting from equation (C.2) into equation (C.5) and rearranging shows that the 
expected wealth is linearly related to the expected utility  
 
( ) ( )( )TWuE
a
TWE 11
1
∆=∆   (C.6) 
 
so that a rise in expected utility ( )( )TWuE 1∆  will imply a rise in expected wealth, 
( )TWE 1∆  when 0=ε . 
 
Meanwhile a positive risk-aversion, 0>ε , implies that the utility function is strictly 
concave.  It will thus obey Jensen’s inequality29: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )TWEuTWuE 11 <   (C.7) 
 
Substituting for ( )( )TWuE 1  from equation (C.4) and for TW1  from equation (C.1) gives 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1111 wTWEuwuTWuE +∆<+∆  (C.8) 
or 
                                                            
29
 JLWV Jensen, 1906, ‘Sur les fonctions convexes et les inégalités entre les valeurs moyennes’ (“On 
convex functions and the inequalities between mean values”), Acta Mathematica, Vol. 30, No. 1, 175 – 193, 
doi:10.1007/BF02418571 
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1111 wuwTWEuTWuE −+∆<∆  (C.9) 
 
Suppose now that the change in expected utility is positive (it is only in this case that the 
claimant will want bring its case forward): 
 
( )( ) 01 >∆ TWuE   (C.10) 
 
It follows from inequality (C.9) that 
 
( )( ) ( )1110 wuwTWEu −+∆<   (C.11) 
 
or  
 
( )( ) ( )111 wuwTWEu >+∆   (C.12) 
 
Since the utility function is monotonically increasing in its argument and 01 >w , this 
implies that 
 
( ) 01 >∆ TWE   (C.13) 
 
Hence for all feasible utility functions, that is to say when 0≥ε , a rise in expected utility 
will imply a rise in expected wealth.
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Figure 1.  Game tree for arbitration. (C = claimant, R = respondent).  The range of 
offers the respondent may make at vertex Y is very large.  The analysis will show 
that there will a unique offer that the respondent would make that will be acceptable 
to the claimant. 
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Figure 2.  Histogram for the logarithm of rATC , the ratio of (total of arbitration costs 
and at-tribunal legal fees) to the size of the claim.  Best-fit logarithmic distribution 
to data from Table 1 of Part II.  
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Figure 3.  The settlement space in the plane of ( ),p v   
 
 
 
 
 
 
